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                                                 ABSTRACT 
 
A half-century after the creation of the Alaska legislature, is it still in the state’s 
interests to have a two-house legislative system? At Alaska’s Constitutional Convention, 
the framers gave great consideration to creating a unicameral legislature, however de-
clined to do so, partially out of fear that an unusual governmental structure might sty-
mie statehood efforts. However, unicameralism has long played a role in American de-
mocracy, and is currently a celebrated part of  the government of Nebraska. Early 
proponents of such systems proclaimed that it would reduce redundancy in governing, 
would cut overall governmental costs,  and would make government more transparent. 
Critics of one-house legislative  systems argue that it can lead to hasty and ill-conceived 
legislation. Alaska might explore a unicameral system largely because of its size—a sin-
gle legislature with smaller districts for each legislator would allow for better constituent 
services, particularly in large rural districts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the evening of November 30, 1955, the fifty-five delegates to 
Alaska’s Constitutional Convention returned to work in the meeting hall 
at the University of Alaska in the town of College, just west of 
Fairbanks. It was the Convention’s twenty-third day, and up to that 
point, most of the delegates’ time had been spent meeting in small 
committees, completing first drafts of what would become the forty-
ninth state’s governing document. General sessions had been brief and 
filled primarily with procedural matters—just that morning, the 
delegates had a meeting that was consumed predominantly by debate 
over an appropriation to pay the Convention’s stenographer. But the 
evening of the thirtieth was to be different. The delegates returned that 
night to make a decision that would determine the very character of the 
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new state government that they had been charged with creating—
should Alaska have one legislative chamber or two? 
The ensuing debate would be both a seminar in state governmental 
theory and a deep look at the nature of the territory that would become 
the state of Alaska. It would pitch delegates who saw Alaska as a blank 
slate upon which they could create the ideal state government against 
delegates who saw the completion of an acceptable constitution as 
another step down the arduous road to statehood. 
The delegates settled upon a two-house legislature, and this system 
has persisted for Alaska’s fifty-one years of statehood. The Convention’s 
minutes indicate that the decision was a cautious one. First, a two-house 
legislature would look ordinary and palatable to Congress, which was 
very suspicious of the peculiar Alaskans. Second, it would allow the 
state to have one chamber where the seats were apportioned based upon 
geography, allowing the voters in Alaska’s most remote corners to have 
just as loud a voice as those in Anchorage and Fairbanks. 
Five decades later, these reasons for adopting Alaska’s bicameral 
system are obsolete—Alaska is no longer a remote territory clamoring 
for statehood, and the Supreme Court has dictated that all state 
legislative seats must be apportioned based on population. Is it now 
time to reconsider the choice made at the Convention? 
While adopting a two-house system made sense for Alaskans of the 
1950s, who placed the greatest priority on becoming a state, there are 
unique elements of modern Alaska that suggest changing to a one-house 
system might be beneficial for Alaska today. Unicameralism is 
particularly well-suited to Alaska because: (1) it would allow some 
legislators to have smaller, more easily traveled districts, thereby 
simplifying the task of representing constituents widely diffused across 
the largest state in the union; (2) it would allow for more efficient 
passage of legislation; and (3) it would make the legislative process 
more open by eliminating the secretive dealings of the conference 
committee, thereby restoring confidence in a legislature that has been 
under scrutiny in recent years. 
Should Alaska switch to a unicameral? This Note raises the 
question and then seeks to provide the information necessary to begin to 
answer it. It does so by first looking at the consideration of 
unicameralism at the state’s Constitutional Convention. It then examines 
the history of some cameral choices in the United States and the 
competing arguments in favor of and against unicameralism. Third, it 
takes a close look at the experience of Nebraska, the only state presently 
with a unicameral legislature. Fourth, it examines the contemporary 
critiques of unicameralism. Finally, it applies these arguments for and 
against unicameralism to contemporary Alaska and analyzes the factors 
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that point toward making the switch to unicameralism and those that 
point toward retaining the current legislative structure.1 
II. THE CREATION OF ALASKA’S BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE 
A. The Territorial Legislature 
Unicameralism was not an altogether unfamiliar concept to 
Alaskans when it was first introduced at the Convention. Between 
December of 1911 and August of 1912, the Sixty-second Congress 
considered and ultimately passed what would become the Home Rule 
Act of 1912,2 granting the Territory of Alaska a legislature and 
substantial local autonomy.3 This Act, coming on the heels of Congress’s 
passage of territorial civil and criminal codes in 1889 and 1900, was a 
significant step towards statehood.4 
James Wickersham, Alaska’s non-voting congressional delegate 
who was said to be the most powerful political figure in the territory at 
the time, spearheaded the movement for territorial autonomy.5 The 
ensuing debate, however, was driven largely by interests outside the 
state of Alaska.6 A variety of interest groups focused their attention on 
it. Some groups sought to ensure that a territorial government would 
not upset their existing interests in Alaska,7 while other reformers saw 
 
 1. This Note does not discuss the process of proposing and implementing a 
unicameral system, nor does it spend much time considering the politics 
involved in abolishing a legislative house. Such factors would be very important 
should Alaskans decide to push for the creation of a single-house system. 
However, they are beyond the scope of this Note. Should this Note convince 
some that a unicameral system would be a positive change in Alaska’s 
governing apparatus, a second study might be necessary detailing how to go 
about making that change. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 62-334, 37 Stat. 512 (1912). 
 3. Id. at 512–13. 
 4. JEANETTE PADDOCK NICHOLS, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF ITS ADMINISTRATION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT DURING ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 
UNDER THE RULE OF THE UNITED STATES 406–07 (1923). 
 5. Id. at 407. 
 6. See id. at 399 (noting Congress was concerned about coal land and 
railroad ownership). 
 7. Id. at 401. For example, wealthy New York game hunters sought to limit 
the ability of the territorial legislature to enact bills relating to the conservation 
of wildlife, and the fishing industry sought to limit the legislature’s ability to tax 
their industry. Id. 
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Alaska as a blank slate upon which they could impose their visions for 
society.8 
The Senate Committee on Territories proposed a one-house 
legislature for the new territory.9 Writing in 1923, early Alaska historian 
Jeanette Paddock Nichols stated, “[The committee] was of a mind to 
make the law-making body unicameral, to the great dismay of 
Wickersham, who feared that such action would kill his measure.”10 She 
reported that the proposal died when the House refused to pass the bill 
without a bicameral structure.11 Ultimately, the Home Rule Act created 
an eight-member senate and a sixteen-member house of representatives, 
with each of the four judicial districts electing four representatives and 
two senators at-large.12 
Nichols’s history, written when Alaska was still in the early days of 
territorial government and more than three decades before the great 
debates of Alaska’s Constitutional Convention, expresses great 
frustration with Congress’s refusal to allow Alaska to experiment with a 
one-house system. She wrote: 
Congress thereby demonstrated once more that it was bound 
by tradition and prefers to stick to it rather than to advance 
along the lines of experimental democracy. In this case it set up 
a legislature to be composed of two bodies of men who had 
duplicate qualifications, duplicate constituents, and duplicate 
work.13 
Nichols’s frustration seems to have stemmed from her belief that 
Alaska had been forced to forego becoming an innovator in state 
government because Washington officials feared too much 
experimentation in this peculiar, distant land. Since Alaska’s elected 
representatives were focused primarily on appeasing the federal 
government in order to attain autonomy, Nichols felt as though Alaska 
was being unnecessarily constrained. This scenario would soon repeat 
itself. 
Ernest Gruening, Alaska’s territorial governor from 1939 until 1953, 
and a United States senator from 1959 until 1969, wrote in 1954 of the 
 
 8. Id. at 399–405. For example, certain groups sought to require stringent 
divorce laws, prohibit the sale of alcohol, and give the legislature the power to 
enact women’s suffrage. Id. 
 9. Id. at 403. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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need “to reform the deficient system of representation in the territorial 
legislature which Congress had lazily imposed on Alaska.”14 
In the following years, Alaska’s representatives repeatedly 
attempted to reform the territorial legislature—most attempts were 
ignored by a Congress bogged down with world wars and the Great 
Depression.15 Several of the efforts, led by the residents of the area 
around Anchorage who were frustrated by the strict geographic-
representative system imposed by Congress, sought to create a system 
of proportional representation for the legislature.16 In the 1930 Census, 
the First Division, the quadrant of the state that included Anchorage, 
had a population of 25,241, with the Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions 
having populations of 11,877, 19,312, and 16,094, respectively.17 
However, each division had been granted equal representation in both 
houses, meaning that four senators who frequently represented less than 
half of the territory’s population could effectively veto any bill, since 
passage through both houses was necessary.18 In 1942, Congress granted 
Alaska proportional representation in the Alaska House of 
Representatives only, despite Alaska’s non-voting delegate having 
sought proportional representation in both houses.19 While this was 
intended to appease the Alaskan delegate, it did little to solve the 
tyranny of the minority that governed the territory. By 1950, effective 
veto-power in the Alaska Senate was wielded by four senators who 
represented less than one third of Alaska’s total population.20 Of 
Congress’s refusal to grant proportional representation for both houses, 
Gruening wrote: 
Here was a bill which concerned Alaska only. It clashed with 
no stateside interests (except those of lobbyists who found the 
original setup easier to manipulate). It embodied a reform 
which a great majority of the people of Alaska wanted, and as 
such was presented to the committee by its one member who 
had knowledge—profound knowledge—of Alaska. Yet it was 
denied Alaskans by the opposition of two members who at that 
time had no first-hand acquaintance with Alaska, but, having 
votes, were able to prevail.21 
 
 14. ERNEST GRUENING, THE STATE OF ALASKA 460 (1954). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 461. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 463. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
ROSS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:40:57 PM 
262 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
This dispute over legislative structure, according to the territory’s 
last governor, was decisive in alerting Alaskans to the need for 
statehood.22 From this episode, it became clear that Alaska, a region with 
condensed population centers and wide swaths of empty land, did not 
need a legislative system that adhered faithfully to the congressional 
model nearly as badly as it needed one that best voiced Alaskan 
interests. 
B. The Politics of Statehood 
Alaska’s quest for statehood formally began in 1946, when a 
referendum of 16,452 Alaskans23 found that sixty percent of voters 
supported becoming a state.24 This poll was taken on the heels of World 
War II, which had brought a large military presence to Alaska and 
provided the economic and population base that many felt was 
necessary to support statehood.25 Those in support of statehood argued 
two major points: (1) statehood would lead to economic development; 
and (2) statehood would lead to increased autonomy through self-
government and freedom from federal regulation.26 
Despite popular support for statehood, the movement had 
influential detractors. The local salmon industry publicly argued that 
there was not a sufficient economic base to support a state; however, 
salmon fishermen were in fact afraid that they would be adversely 
affected by new state regulation and taxation.27 The military also 
opposed statehood.28 Alaska’s close proximity to Russia and the Korean 
Peninsula gave it strategic significance in the early days of the Cold War, 
and commanders feared a new state government would interfere in 
military operations.29 Finally, by 1953, the new Republican majorities in 
both houses of Congress and the new Republican president opposed 
statehood for Alaska.30 They feared that the traditionally Democratic 
territory’s admission to the union would offset the congressional gains 
that the Republicans were expecting from the admission of the 
 
 22. Id. at 463–64. 
 23. Id. at 464. Alaska had a population close to 118,000 in 1946 when this ref-
erendum occurred. 
 24. STEPHEN HAYCOX, ALASKA: AN AMERICAN COLONY 268 (2002). 
 25. Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant 
Originalism and Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. 
REV. 293, 302–03 (2005). 
 26. HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 268–69. 
 27. Id. at 269. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
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conservative-leaning Hawaii.31 Hawaiian statehood would fail that year 
as well, however, due to opposition by a powerful member of the 
Senate.32 
By the early 1950s, these politically powerful opposition groups 
had begun to mobilize to defeat an Alaska statehood measure.33 Various 
alternatives to admitting the full territory as a state were considered.34 
This process consumed the congressional discussion of Alaska from 
1953 through 1955,35 with the Republican government refusing to 
consider the admission of the full territory as a state.36 
In the fall of 1954, Democrats regained congressional majorities and 
won majorities in the territorial legislature.37 Alaska’s Democratic 
territorial legislators, frustrated by congressional inertia, called the 
Constitutional Convention, believing that having a governing document 
already prepared would advance the statehood effort.38 Professor 
Stephen Haycox of the University of Alaska wrote that the members of 
the legislature believed that “[a] successful convention and progressive 
state constitution would demonstrate Alaskans’ self-governing 
capabilities.”39 They were buoyed by the words of Governor Gruening, 
who had written, “Alaskans had stood too much, too long, to be 
discouraged or other than determined to fight on to validate the most 
 
 31. CLAUS-M. NASKE, AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF ALASKA STATEHOOD 112–13 
(1973). In his 1953 State of the Union address, President Eisenhower called for 
the immediate admission of Hawaii to the union but did not mention Alaska. Id. 
Only after the House of Representatives passed a bill granting Hawaii admission 
did the chair of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee announce a date to 
begin hearings on Alaska statehood. Id. 
 32. GRUENING, supra note 14, at 471. 
 33. See HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 268–69. 
 34. NASKE, supra note 31, at 121–25. These alternatives included: (1) granting 
Alaska commonwealth status, as had been done for Puerto Rico, which would 
include all of the rights, privileges, and obligations of statehood except for na-
tional representation and the duty of paying federal taxes; (2) partitioning the 
territory and admitting only the populated areas as a new state, leaving the least 
populated areas, which had the most natural resources, as a territory. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 126, 133. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 133. As Alaska prepared for its own Constitutional Convention, the 
new Democratic majorities in Congress were proving as resistant to Alaska 
statehood as their Republican predecessors. In 1955, the House Rules Committee 
effectively killed a measure that would have provided statehood for both Alaska 
and Hawaii. Id. at 138. Throughout most of that year, momentum seemed to be 
gaining for a compromise that would grant Alaska an elected governor but not 
statehood. Id. 
 39. HAYCOX, supra note 24, at 270. 
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basic of American principles—government by consent of the 
governed.”40 
C. The Constitutional Convention and Alaska’s Flirtation with 
Unicameralism 
The Convention began on November 8, 1955, but it was not until 
the twenty-third day that the first pivotal floor debate occurred.41 The 
delegates had spent the first weeks listening to testimony from citizens 
who had been given open access to the Convention,42 meeting in 
committees,43 and discussing issues such as which musician to have 
record an official version of the state song and whether the new 
constitution should be written in the present tense or the future perfect, 
as was customary for such documents.44 
By the twenty-third day, however, the Convention was prepared to 
make perhaps the key structural decision about the new government it 
was creating. The day before the debate on how many houses to include 
in the new legislature, the Daily Alaska Empire of Juneau published an 
article proclaiming that “[d]elegates to the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention are ready to tackle what could be the most controversial 
issue of the historic get-together.”45 The article noted that although the 
concept of unicameralism was not on the minds of many delegates when 
the Convention had begun three weeks earlier, it had swiftly gained 
momentum over the course of the Convention.46 A Fairbanks Daily News-
Miner article echoed these sentiments, stating “[t]he issue was 
apparently no issue at all when the Convention began but a one-house 
setup has been gaining momentum and weight and is now the pivotal 
question of the Convention, on which so much committee work 
 
 40. GRUENING, supra note 14, at 492. 
 41. Minutes of the 23rd Day of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 30, 
1955), http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/23.html [hereinafter 
23rd Minutes]. 
 42. See Record, Grammar Occupy Delegates in Fourth Week, FAIRBANKS DAILY 
NEWS-MINER, Nov. 28, 1955, at A1. 
 43. Target Dates Set by Nine Committees of Convention, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-
MINER, Nov. 30, 1955, at A7. Issues the committees had been wrestling with 
included: (1) whether to reapportion the legislative districts at the Convention or 
task the new legislature with that work; (2) what form local governments should 
take; and (3) what rights to include in a bill of rights. Id. 
 44. Record, Grammar Occupy Delegates in Fourth Week, supra note 42, at A1. 
 45. Delegates to Consider Type of Legislature at Hearing Tonight, DAILY ALASKA 
EMPIRE, Nov. 30, 1955, at A1. 
 46. Issue Splits Delegates to Convention, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Nov. 
29, 1955, at A1. 
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depends.”47 The Juneau reporter noted of the unicameral proposal, 
“Supporters say they believe it is most suited to Alaska’s needs. . . . 
[and] it would eliminate the so-called log rolling between the two 
houses.”48 
Unicameralism had last been considered for Alaska some four 
decades earlier when the territorial legislature was being designed. In 
the meantime it had become a celebrated cause of populist reformers but 
had been implemented in only one state, Nebraska.49 In advance of the 
Convention, a report by the Public Administration Service, Inc., a 
Chicago-based consulting firm hired by the territorial government to 
assist in the drafting of the constitution,50 had stated, with little 
elaboration, that Alaska’s small population and economy potentially 
suggested creating a unicameral legislature.51 
The issue of how many houses to include had not even been aired 
in committee prior to its coming to the Convention’s floor.52 Convention 
leaders had deemed it too controversial to be taken up in the early 
weeks, so discussion of unicameralism had been limited to side 
conversations among delegates outside the formal proceedings.53 This 
political “hot potato,” as it was described in the Fairbanks Daily News-
Miner,54 finally came to the forefront of the Convention on November 28, 
1955, when Delegate Steve McCutcheon moved that the convention 
reconvene in two days in a Committee of the Whole session to take up 
the matter.55 There was some resistance to this suggestion, with Delegate 
Victor Fischer,56 who would go on to write the authoritative history of 
the Convention, requesting that the committee on the legislature first 
consider the issue so as to avoid a “free for all” on the Convention 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Delegates to Consider Type of Legislature at Hearing Tonight, supra note 45, at 
A1. 
 49. See infra Part III.B. 
 50. See Consultants for Convention Committees Are Due Here, FAIRBANKS DAILY 
NEWS-MINER, Nov. 30, 1955, at A8. 
 51. VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 85 (1975). The 
report also placed a caveat on this assertion, saying that because of popular 
satisfaction with the territorial legislature’s two-house scheme, it might prove 
arduous to implement a unicameral system. Id. 
 52. See Issue Splits Delegates to Convention, supra note 46, at A1. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Minutes of the 21st Day of the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 28, 
1955), http://www.law.state.ak.us/doclibrary/conconv/21.html [hereinafter 
21st Minutes]. 
 56. EVANGELINE ATWOOD & ROBERT N. DEARMOND, WHO’S WHO IN ALASKAN 
POLITICS 29 (1977). 
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floor.57 In response to this, McCutcheon stated that a “free for all” was 
what he wanted to see.58 In support of McCutcheon’s motion, Delegate 
Mildred Hermann59 stated: 
I feel this meeting should be held during the regular session of 
the Convention and it won’t do any harm if the work of the 
committees is interrupted for such a meeting, because after we 
have this Committee of the Whole consideration of this 
measure I think all  the committees are going back to their own 
work probably a little better able to reach and formulate 
decisions than they were before they heard it. To me it seems 
apparent that much of the business of this meeting that is 
ultimately going to be finalized depends upon the approach to 
the question of whether we are going to have a unicameral or a 
bicameral legislature.60 
The body agreed to hold the debate and take a non-binding vote at 
the conclusion of the discussion in order to guide the work of the 
committees in the weeks ahead.61 
When the debate began on November 30, it appeared that the 
majority of delegates favored bicameralism. John McNees of Nome, 
however, a meteorologist and operator of a private transportation 
business with no prior background in government,62 proceeded to make 
elaborate arguments in favor of unicameralism hoping to sway the 
body.63 
First, McNees described bicameralism as antiquated and 
unnecessary.64 He borrowed heavily from the writing of former 
Nebraska Senator George W. Norris,65 arguing that: (1) bicameralism 
was unnecessary in a homogenous state that had no clear divisions 
within the citizenry;66 and (2) the conference committee inherent in 
 
 57. See 21st Minutes, supra note 55. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Ms. Hermann was an attorney from Juneau and protégé of James Wick-
ersham, the congressional delegate who had opposed unicameralism for Alaska 
a generation earlier.  ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 43–44. 
 60. 21st Minutes, supra note 55. 
 61. See Issue Splits Delegates to Convention, supra note 46, at A1. 
 62. ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 65. 
 63. See FISCHER, supra note 51, at  85–87. 
 64. See 23rd Minutes, supra note 41 (noting the original reason for two 
branches was so that one could be a check on the power of royalty and the other 
could represent the people). 
 65. See infra Part III.B. 
 66. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41 (“There is no need to give the two branches 
the same authority to do the same thing. . . . [W]here the work of the two bodies 
is identical, requiring that the work be done twice . . . [is] illogical.”). 
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bicameralism led to corruption by putting a decisive emphasis on 
backroom deals between members in the conference committee rather 
than open debate on the legislative floor.67 
McNees then listed seven merits of the unicameral system: (1) a 
unicameral legislature operates more efficiently, ensuring that all 
introduced bills are swiftly considered by committee and given an up or 
down vote; (2) a single body eliminates animosity and friction between 
members of two houses; (3) a single chamber centralizes legislative 
responsibility and creates clearly identifiable leadership; (4) the 
unicameral system leads to cost-savings; (5) membership in one body 
generates greater social prestige and stature, thereby encouraging public 
service among qualified individuals; (6) the one-house system reduces 
the off-stage sway of special interest groups68 and facilitates the ability 
of citizens to openly petition government; and (7) it is easier for an 
executive to work with one house than two.69 While McNees’s list was 
extensive, his reasons were primarily the virtues that reformers before 
him across the country had cited in advocating for unicameralism.70 
McNees failed to incorporate Alaska’s peculiar needs (stemming from 
the state’s small population, large territory, and developing economy) 
into his argument for unicameralism. 
One delegate, Barrie M. White, an Anchorage businessman who 
had served as the president of the Operation Statehood organization,71 
proclaimed that he was “on the fence” on the issue, yet he rose to say 
that he had “a feeling that a much better case can be made by more 
people for unicameralism than has been made tonight.”72 White argued 
that one of the territory’s leading problems was sectionalism.73 He also 
argued that a unicameral legislature might reduce that problem because 
each member would be “more conscious of the fact that he represents all 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. FISCHER, supra note 51, at 86–87.  McNees stated that a bicameral system 
allowed more opportunities for lobbyists to gain control of the legislative 
process. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. For example, they could seek to control an 
entire house, or they could seek to control just the leadership of the houses, 
which would influence who was appointed to conference committees and 
subsequently affect the outcome of the legislative process. Id. Delegate Maynard 
D. Londborg refuted this point, arguing that a unicameral legislature would 
make it easier for lobbyists to gain a foothold, as they would “have all their eggs 
in one basket and only the one house to worry about.” Id. 
 69. FISCHER, supra note 51, at 87. 
 70. See George W. Norris, A Model State Legislature, reprinted in One Branch 
Legislature for States Would Improve Results, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1923, at 12; 
discussion infra Part III. 
 71. ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 105. 
 72. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. 
 73. Id. 
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of the Territory.”74 While nothing in the unicameral proposal implied 
that each member would represent all Alaskans despite being elected by 
distinct districts, this point was significant because it was based on 
Alaska’s unique needs. Unlike McNees, White recognized that a 
relatively low population scattered across a huge territory would best be 
served by smaller districts apportioned based on population. 
Delegate Jack Hinckel of Kodiak, a city experiencing a boom as a 
result of the construction of military installations near the town in the 
wake of World War II, stated that he thought opponents’ claims that a 
unicameral legislature would lead to rushed consideration of legislation 
were overblown.75 He argued, “I think if we only have one house that 
the people in that house will give more deliberation to the subject that 
they are discussing, and I think they will vote the way they feel they 
should and the way the people they represent expect them to . . . .”76 
Another delegate, B.D. Stewart, a former mayor of Juneau now 
representing Sitka,77 stated that he had attended almost all of the 
sessions of the territorial legislature and from these sessions, he had 
come to the conclusion that unicameralism might be an appropriate 
remedy for the ills of the old legislature. He stated: 
Session after session I have seen measures that were for the 
benefit of the people as a whole pass through the House with a 
heavy majority, come up to the Senate, which in the earlier 
days had eight members, two of those members were 
employees of one large mining company, one of them their 
chief attorney. If those two men alone with one other could 
persuade a fourth person to join them, they would kill any 
beneficial legislation for the benefit of the whole people by 
producing a tie.78 
He argued that having one chamber meet frequently, which 
proportionately represented citizens in such a way that each citizen had 
a roughly equal vote, would potentially “eliminate the painful effects of 
lobbying.”79 
Proponents of bicameralism relied upon familiar arguments—that 
bicameralism provided for better checks and balances and a more 
deliberative process, which would presumably produce more 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 95–96. 
 78. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. 
 79. Id. 
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thoughtful legislation.80 Reasons for bicameralism based on the needs 
and interests of Alaskans and Alaska’s quest for statehood were also 
presented.81 
Delegate Ralph J. Rivers of Fairbanks, an attorney well-versed in 
government after serving as the territory’s United States Attorney and as 
a territorial senator,82 recognized that Alaska’s population was small 
and diffused across a huge territory. Having one single system that 
relied upon proportional representation could lead to very large districts 
in the remote areas, inhibiting the ability of rural Alaskans to influence 
the legislative process.83 He felt that an upper chamber needed to be one 
of geographical representation to ensure that the southern areas with the 
highest population density would not “wag the whole dog around.”84 
Another delegate, Dora M. Sweeney of Juneau, pointed out that 
twice in the preceding two decades, the territorial legislature had 
considered and rejected efforts to create a unicameral legislature.85 
Sweeney argued that these past failures to switch to a unicameral raised 
doubts about Alaskans’ willingness to accept a one-house system.86 She 
argued that Congress might reject the Convention’s proposed 
constitution if it did not have popular support.87 Similarly, Delegate 
Seaborn J. Buckalew, Jr., of Anchorage, argued that adopting a 
unicameral house would “be taking the voters of Alaska by surprise.”88 
He speculated that it would take a great public relations campaign to get 
the people to buy into such a system.89 Buckalew felt that this burden 
would hinder the quest for statehood.90 
 
 80. FISCHER, supra note 51, at 87. 
 81. Id. 
 82. ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 85. 
 83. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. 
 84. Id. As discussed below, Rivers’s argument would become moot within a 
decade with the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1963), which held that the Court’s previously stated “one man, one vote” 
requirement applied to legislative districting. This argument is strange coming 
from Rivers, a representative of Anchorage, a city that had been subject to the 
will of the minority in the territorial senate which had often overruled the will of 
the majority due to the upper house’s system of geographic representation. 
 85. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (“I think that if we do not go to Congress with some assurance that 
the unicameral legislature is going to work in Alaska, then we will find 
ourselves waiting, not to be the 49th state but the 50th state.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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Delegate William A. Egan of Valdez, who would go on to become 
Alaska’s first state governor in 1959,91 argued that a unicameral system 
would be unwise when Alaska’s people had barely had a chance to 
experience the traditional bicameral system. Egan said: 
We have had a running wild system . . . both in the makeup of 
the Territorial Senate and the makeup of the Territorial House. 
Our citizens here have not had the opportunity to view . . . a 
bicameral system of legislative bodies in action . . . . We know 
that our United States has become the freest, the fairest and the 
greatest nation on earth under the bicameral system, and I hope 
that this Convention will continue that form of legislative 
government.92 
After three and a half hours, the debate concluded with four 
concerned citizens speaking, two in favor of bicameralism and two in 
favor of unicameralism.93 The Fairbanks Daily News-Miner reported that 
one of those citizens, Niilo Koponen of Chena Ridge, himself a defeated 
candidate for delegate, “brought a howl of laughter when he drily 
stated, ‘I never could see much sense in hiring two bunches of 
politicians who went off to two sides of the hall and argued twice on the 
same question.’”94 
Though no formal vote was taken on the measure, thirty of the 
fifty-five delegates spoke on the matter, with only four expressing a 
preference for unicameralism and only two reporting being undecided.95 
The committee drafting the section of the constitution on the legislature 
appears to have taken this discussion as a charge to craft a two-house 
system. Weeks later, the committee produced a final document that 
included a two-house system and put it to the citizens without further 
discussion of unicameralism.96 
While proponents of the two-house legislature often cited the grand 
tradition of checks and balances inherent in bicameralism, the record 
suggests that the delegates were more persuaded by the ways that 
having two houses would suit Alaska’s interests and needs of the time. 
Having two houses meant that Alaska would have a legislature with 
seats in one chamber apportioned based on geography—ensuring that 
the interests of rural voters would not be ignored. Having two houses 
 
 91. ATWOOD & DEARMOUND, supra note 56, at 26. 
 92. 23rd Minutes, supra note 41. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Delegates Show Preference for Two House Legislature, FAIRBANKS DAILY 
NEWS-MINER, Dec. 1, 1955, at A1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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ensured that congressmen voting on statehood would not pause at a 
novel scheme put forth by a territory already considered eccentric.97 
Having two houses provided some guarantee that the people of Alaska 
would not reject the constitution produced by the Convention, 
stymieing statehood efforts. Those in favor of unicameralism relied 
largely on political theory. The body was quick to elevate achieving 
statehood and providing a workable government for a young state 
above governmental theory—bicameralism was the clear choice. 
In the midst of the discussion of checks and balances and repetitive 
political practices, however, the fact that a bicameral system had not 
worked extremely well up to that point in Alaska was somewhat 
overlooked. The delegates that spoke in favor of unicameralism came 
primarily from urban centers and probably recognized the risks of a new 
state senate allowing representatives of a minority of the population to 
control the government, as had occurred in the territorial legislature. 
The debate accentuated the tension in the state between rural and urban 
voters—a unique feature of Alaska that persists today. 
After seventy-five days of work, the Convention produced the 
Alaska Constitution in early 1956.98  On April 24, 1956, the people of 
Alaska formally ratified the document.99 That year, momentum 
increased for Alaska statehood with the appointment of a new Interior 
Secretary who supported the cause; in 1958, President Eisenhower came 
out in support of the effort.100 In July of that year, he signed a bill 
granting Alaska statehood.101 In January of 1959, Alaska was formally 
admitted to the union by presidential proclamation, with the work of the 
Constitutional Convention serving as its governing document.102 
III. UNICAMERALISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
Alaska’s Constitutional Convention was not the first to discuss 
unicameralism—by the time the drafters of the Convention gathered, the 
debate over cameral choice in the United States had been raging for over 
a half century. 
 
 97. CLAUS-M. NASKE AND HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF THE 
49TH STATE 155 (2d ed. 1987). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 155–56. 
 101. Id. at 157. 
 102. Id. 
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A. Unicameralism in Early American Governments 
After the American Revolution, ten of the thirteen original states 
had bicameral systems.103  The three unicameral states quickly added 
second houses following the ratification of the Constitution.104 
The drafters of the Vermont Constitution borrowed heavily from 
Pennsylvania’s system and included a unicameral legislature.105 The 
State operated relatively harmoniously under the unicameral system 
from 1777 until 1835,106 during which period leading newspapers 
repeatedly published editorials against the addition of a second 
house.107 However, a bicameral system was eventually instituted amidst 
allegations that the one-house legislature had grown corrupt.108 
B. Unicameralism and the Twentieth Century Progressives 
After Vermont’s switch, unicameralism was primarily considered 
only by political theorists throughout the nineteenth century.109 The 
concept was resuscitated in the early twentieth century by the 
Progressive reformers of state governments.110 Between 1912 and 1920, 
 
 103. James A.C. Grant, The Bicameral Principle in the California Legislature, in 
UNICAMERALISM IN PRACTICE: THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 182, 183–87 
(Harrison Boyd Summers ed., 1937). Pennsylvania, Delaware,                                                                 
and Georgia were the three states with unicameral systems. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Daniel B. Carroll, The Unicameral Legislature of Vermont, in 
UNICAMERALISM IN PRACTICE: THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM, supra note 103, 
at 189–90. 
 106. Id. at 194. 
 107. Id. at 192–93. Newspaper editorials of the day also argued that 
bicameralism would, among other things: (1) eliminate conflict between the 
executive and legislative branches of government; (2) reduce the tendency of the 
unicameral legislature towards hasty, imprudent decisions; and (3) eliminate the 
inherently combative nature of the unicameral system. Id. 
 108. Id. at 194–95. The allegations of corruption arose out of the gubernatorial 
election of 1835, in which no candidate received a majority of the vote. Id. at 194. 
As a result, the legislature was left to decide a governor. Id. After twenty-four 
days, the session was unable to resolve the dispute and the lieutenant governor 
was allowed to serve out the term. Id. This episode led to claims that the 
legislature was bogged down in “bargaining for office,” and within three years, 
a second house was added. Id. 
 109. James R. Rogers, Judicial Review Standards in Unicameral Legislative 
Systems: A Positive Theoretic and Historical Analysis, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 65, 69 
(1999). 
 110. Id. 
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over one-third of all states considered, but ultimately rejected, some 
form of a unicameral system.111 
Those who advocated for unicameral systems cited various 
reasons, many of which would become familiar to Alaska’s 
Constitutional Convention delegates. Senator George W. Norris of 
Nebraska, a leading Progressive, denounced the evils of the conference 
committee used in bicameral systems when two houses have passed 
different versions of the same bill.112 Writing in 1935, Norris objected to 
the way that bills reported out of conference committees, without the 
possibility for subsequent amendment, which left legislators with few 
alternatives. “[Legislators] must accept the evil to get the good. If they 
want to reject the evil, they likewise must reject the good,” Norris 
wrote.113 He also objected to the way that conference committees met in 
secret without a public record being kept.114 In response to those who 
claimed that this problem could be remedied by opening committee 
meetings to the public, Norris responded that no such opening had ever 
occurred in the history of state legislatures and that he doubted one 
would occur “because it would at once show to the public that the 
conference committee is in reality a third house, and that it is the most 
powerful one of the three.”115 Finally, Norris asserted that a bicameral 
system was more likely to engender corruption and allow special 
interest groups to influence the political process.116 This was because the 
conference committee’s pivotal role as the final hurdle in the legislative 
process meant “[a]ll that is necessary to prevent action is to be able to 
control two of the senate conferees, or two of the house conferees.”117 
Norris also argued that bicameralism was ill-suited for the 
purposes of state legislatures and resulted in an unnecessary duplication 
of functions. He pointed out that in Great Britain, Parliament had 
become bicameral because of a desire to represent the distinct interests 
 
 111. John P. Senning, The One-House Legislature, in UNICAMERALISM IN 
PRACTICE: THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM, supra note 103, at 197–200. 
Oklahoma came the closest to adopting a unicameral system during this period, 
with voters supporting a 1914 ballot initiative creating one by a margin of 58% to 
42%; however, state law required that the initiative pass with a majority of all 
ballots cast, and because 75,000 voters had expressed no preference, the measure 
was defeated. Rogers, supra note 109, at 70. 
 112. George W. Norris, The One-House Legislature, in UNICAMERALISM IN 
PRACTICE: THE NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM, supra note 103, at 20507. 
 113. Id. at 206. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 208. 
 116. Id. at 20809. 
 117. Id. at 209. 
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of the nobility and the commoners.118 He argued that the drafters of the 
American Constitution had borrowed this model with the goal of the 
House of Representatives representing the general public and the Senate 
“elected from the wealthy, aristocratic class, to represent the 
aristocracy.”119 In the context of state legislatures, though, there were no 
clear divisions within the electorate that would necessitate two separate 
houses.120 “There is no reason to give the two branches . . . the same 
authority to do the same thing, where they possess the same 
qualifications for office and where the work of the two bodies is 
identical.”121 Norris deemed it “illogical” that both houses had the same 
jurisdiction and performed the same functions.122 
Despite a strong Progressive influence in many states during the 
early part of the century, Norris was able to persuade only his home 
state to adopt the unicameral system. In a 1934 referendum, the voters of 
Nebraska overwhelmingly adopted a nonpartisan unicameral legislature 
at Norris’s behest.123 In the aftermath of Nebraska’s change, a new flurry 
of interest was stoked in unicameralism, with twelve state legislatures 
considering unicameral proposals in 1935 and twenty-one state 
legislatures considering such proposals in 1937; none of the states chose 
to adopt such a system.124 
C. Reynolds v. Sims and Its Implications on the Debate 
The unicameral movement got new momentum in 1964, when the 
Supreme Court announced its opinion in Reynolds v. Sims.125 A year after 
announcing the “one person, one vote” doctrine in Gray v. Sanders,126 the 
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment required that all state legislative districts be apportioned 
on a population basis.127 Recognizing that its decision would make one 
 
 118. Norris, supra note 103, at 213. 
 119. Id. at 214. 
 120. Id. at 215. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. 
REV. 791, 799 (1997). The ballot initiative creating the unicameral won majority 
votes in eighty-four of Nebraska’s ninety-three counties and 1,956 of the state’s 
2,029 precincts. Id. 
 124. Rogers, supra note 109, at 72. 
 125. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 126. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
 127. 377 U.S. at 576–77. The Court held that states could not merely follow the 
federal bicameral model when apportioning legislative seats because the federal 
model had grown out of a compromise between “separate and distinct 
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of the key justifications for having two houses in state legislatures 
obsolete, the Court offered some assurance of the continued vitality of 
bicameralism at the state level, explaining: 
We do not believe that the concept of bicameralism is rendered 
anachronistic and meaningless when the predominant basis of 
representation in the two state legislative bodies is required to 
be the same—population. A prime reason for bicameralism, 
modernly considered, is to insure mature and deliberate 
consideration of, and to prevent precipitate action on, proposed 
legislative measures. Simply because the controlling criterion 
for apportioning representation is required to be the same in 
both houses does not mean that there will be no differences in 
the composition and complexion of the two bodies.128  
The Court then went on to list various measures the states could 
take to ensure “differing complexions and collective attitudes in the two 
bodies of a state legislature, although both are apportioned substantially 
on a population basis.”129 
Despite the Court’s assurances, Reynolds has been used to support 
consideration of unicameralism during the past four decades,130 with 
proponents arguing that bicameral systems are unnecessary and 
redundant if they cannot provide an increased voice to voters living in 
sparsely populated areas.131 
IV. THE LONE AMERICAN UNICAMERAL TODAY 
Nebraska retains the only state legislature in the country operating 
with just one house. As such, it is useful to examine the legislature’s 
 
governmental entities,” whereas, “[p]olitical subdivisions of States . . . never 
were and never have been considered as sovereign entities.” Id. at 574–75. 
 128. Id. at 576. 
 129. Id. at 577. The methods the Court cited included: (1) having one body 
composed of single-member districts and another composed of multi-member 
districts; (2) using different term lengths in the two houses; (3) making the size 
of the two chambers significantly different; (4) making the district sizes of one 
chamber much larger than that of the other chamber; and (5) apportioning one 
house “so as to balance off minor inequities in the representation of certain areas 
in the other house.” Id. 
 130. Professor Rogers reports that since Reynolds, the following states that 
considered unicameralism, either formally or informally, include: Florida, North 
Dakota, California, Montana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Hawaii, New York, 
Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Rogers, supra note 109, at 73–74. 
 131. See Robak, supra note 123, at 807 (“Bicameralism lost its main purpose 
after Reynolds v. Sims . . . .”). 
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structure and the state’s experience with unicameralism when 
considering a one-house system for Alaska. 
A. The Structure and Procedure of the Nebraska Unicameral 
The Nebraska legislature consists of one house with forty-nine 
members,132 all elected on nonpartisan ballots.133 All legislators serve 
four-year terms, with half of the members up for election every two 
years.134 Legislative committee assignments are made by the Committee 
on Committees, a twelve-member panel made up of three members 
from each of Nebraska’s four congressional districts that existed in 
1937.135 Former Nebraska Lieutenant Governor Kim Robak notes that 
this committee safeguards the interests of rural voters in a legislature 
without a chamber with seats apportioned based on geography.136 
Legislation moves through Nebraska’s unicameral in much the 
same way as it does in individual chambers of bicameral legislatures, 
but with two unique measures that ensure the legislature will not act 
excessively hastily: (1) after a piece of legislation’s referral to committee, 
the committee considering it must hold a public hearing on the bill;137 
 
 132. The previous system in Nebraska consisted of a 100-member House of 
Representatives and a 33-member Senate. Michael S. Dulaney, History of the 
Nebraska Legislature, NEBRASKA COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS (Sept. 26, 
2010, 11:35 PM), http://legislative.ncsa.org/2010/09/history-of-the-nebraska-
legislature/. 
 133. NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 7. Norris believed making the unicameral 
nonpartisan would further ensure that the influence of lobbyists and special 
interest groups would be reduced and would more closely link legislators with 
their constituents, as each legislator would be required to campaign as an 
individual rather than as a member of a party. Robak, supra note 123, at 797–98. 
Another common objection to partisan state legislatures was that national 
political platforms had no place in the mundane issues of state governance. See 
Hugo F. Srb, The Unicameral Legislature—A Successful Innovation, 40 NEB. L. REV. 
626, 632 (1961) (“How should partisan politics enter the picture when the 
consideration of building a good highway system is being considered, or the 
providing of a good educational system, or adequate care of unfortunates . . . ?”).  
While Nebraska simultaneously abolished a legislative house and made its 
legislature nonpartisan, these are distinct reforms that carry with them distinct 
costs and benefits. This Note’s lone focus is on the potential effects of Alaska 
adopting a one-house system—the results of Nebraska’s legislature becoming 
nonpartisan are beyond its scope. A separate study might be helpful should 
Alaska wish to consider making its legislature nonpartisan. 
 134. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 7. 
 135. NEB. UNICAM. R. 3 § 2(b) (2008). 
 136. Robak, supra note 123, at 801. To date, there has been no challenge to this 
form of geographic representation in a state legislature, despite the Court’s 
holding in Reynolds. 
 137. NEB. UNICAM. R. 3 § 13 (2008). 
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and (2) each bill must receive four readings on the floor of the 
legislature, providing opportunities for debate and amendment.138 
B. Results of Nebraska’s Switch to the Unicameral 
1. Cost savings 
In 1952, a study reported that the unicameral had led to reduced 
spending on the legislature.139 Whereas in the last bicameral two-year 
session, ending in 1936, the total expenditure on legislative salaries was 
$106,400; in 1952, the total expenditure for the two-year session was just 
$75,000.140 The same study also reported that the unicameral had led to 
savings between $8,000 and $10,000 per session stemming from the 
lower total number of legislators.141 
Currently, Nebraska spends $588,000 annually on legislative 
salaries,142 which is slightly greater than one-third of the 1936 figure, 
when the 1936 amount is adjusted for inflation.143  With one of the 
lowest base annual salaries for legislators ($12,000),144 and the smallest 
number of seats of any American state legislature,145 Nebraska’s 
spending on salaries for legislators is among the country’s lowest.146 
2.  No increase in legislative speed 
The unicameral has not proven to be more efficient than the old 
bicameral. The final five sessions of the bicameral legislature, which met 
only once every other year, lasted an average of ninety-three days.147 
 
 138. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEB. UNICAM. R. 6 (2008). 
 139. Roger V. Shumate, The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature, 5 W. POL. Q. 504, 
506 (1952). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 507. 
 142. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATOR 
COMPENSATION 2009, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=14785 (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
 143. When Nebraska’s 1936 expenditure of $106,400 is adjusted for inflation 
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index, it comes to 
$1,655,936.12. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
 144. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 142. 
 145. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CONSTITUENT PER STATE 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT, http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/ 
Redistricting/ConstituentsperStateLegislativeDistrict/tabid/16643/Default.asp
x (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
 146. In a normal year, Nebraska spends less on legislative salaries than any 
state except for New Hampshire, which pays its 424 legislators only $200 per 
two-year session. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 142. 
 147. Shumate, supra note 139, at 507. 
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The 1952 study reported that, from the change in 1937 to 1952, the 
biannual legislative session had lasted an average of 104.5 days.148 In 
1970, the number of legislative days was increased, as the unicameral 
began to meet annually, meeting for 90 days in odd numbered years and 
60 days in even numbered years.149 
“In all probability . . . the increased length of regular sessions 
should be attributed to the more deliberate procedure adopted by the 
unicameral legislature,” the writer of the 1952 study speculated.150 This 
hypothesis was based on the fact that, while the number of legislative 
days had increased since 1937, the average number of bills introduced 
during a session of the Unicameral from 1937 to 1952 was just 517, 
compared to an average of 908 bills introduced during the last five 
sessions of the Bicameral.151 Such evidence suggests that concerns over a 
unicameral legislature running slipshod over deliberative procedure 
and passing weak legislation without proper deliberation were 
unfounded. Instead, it appears as though the Unicameral has 
encouraged increased deliberation. This is probably the result of the 
extensive legislative procedure required by the Unicameral’s founders, 
most notably the public hearing requirement.152 
3. Passage of Effective Legislation 
While it is difficult to measure the quality of work of any 
legislature, the 1952 study suggested that, in comparison to the pre-1937 
bicameral legislature, the Unicameral had produced “fewer laws . . . 
declared unconstitutional . . . and fewer statutes . . . found to have ‘bugs’ 
or ‘jokers’ in them as a result of faulty draftsmanship or as a result of 
bills being shunted back and forth between two houses . . . .”153 While it 
appears that no one has completed a similar review of the quality of the 
legislature’s work since 1952, the Nebraska Supreme Court has, in recent 
years, gained a reputation for judicial restraint.154 Without a reliable, 
rational legislature to defer to, it is unlikely the Court could have 
developed this reputation. 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10 (amended 1970, Laws 1969, ch. 415, § 1, p. 1424). 
 150. Shumate, supra note 139, at 507. 
 151. Id. at 508. 
 152. Id. at 509. 
 153. Id. at 508. 
 154. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Umpires Not Activists: The Recent 
Jurisprudence of the Nebraska Supreme Court (FEDERALIST SOCIETY White Paper 
2009), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090319_ 
NebraskaWPMarch2009.pdf; Michelle L. Sitorius, Note, The Political Question 
Doctrine: A Thin Black Line Between Judicial Deference and Judicial Review, 87 NEB. L. 
REV. 793, 812 (2009). 
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Nebraska Supreme Court Justice John Garrard, a fifteen-year 
veteran of the state’s highest court, stated that it was his belief that the 
Nebraska judiciary was not called upon to interpret statutory 
ambiguities or strike down unconstitutional statutes any more 
frequently than other states’ courts of last resort, and that generally 
speaking, the legislature did not act too quickly.155 Garrard suggested 
that this was due in large part to the legislature’s veteran members 
serving as almost an upper-house, moderating the body when it tried to 
move too quickly.156 
4.  Public Satisfaction 
Finally, evidence suggests that there is general satisfaction among 
the electorate with the Unicameral. A 1996 study of the legislature 
reported that the majority of Nebraskans polled throughout the 1980s 
were satisfied with the legislature’s work.157 Pride in Nebraska’s unique 
place as the only state with a unicameral legislature can be seen in a 
variety of places: (1) the fact that one of the final designs considered for 
Nebraska’s state quarter in 2005 included the phrase “home of the 
unicameral;”158 (2) the statements of Nebraska’s politicians on the 
unicameral, like those of Robak, who wrote, “[O]ur system is far 
superior to partisan two-house systems;”159 and (3) the lengthy internet 
materials that the legislature has published extolling the virtues of its 
unique system of governance.160 
V. CRITICISM OF UNICAMERAL SYSTEMS 
Despite the popularity of the unicameral system within Nebraska, 
the bicameral system persists in all other states. While bicameralism’s 
perseverance is probably at least partially attributable to tradition, there 
are theoretical objections to state legislatures being unicameral. The 
 
 155. Telephone Interview with Justice John Garrard, Nebraska Supreme 
Court (Apr. 21, 2010). 
 156. Id. Justice Garrard suggested that Nebraska’s term limits on legislatures 
have, in recent years, had the unfortunate effect of diminishing the institutional 
memory necessary for the functional operation of a unicameral. He advised that 
any state considering such a system would not want to also borrow Nebraska’s 
term limit model. Id. 
 157. Patrick J. O’Donnell, A Unicameral Legislature, 1996 J. AM. SOC. LEGIS. 
CLERKS AND SECRETARIES 8. 
 158. Scott Bauer, Heineman To Receive Final State Quarter Designs Next Week, 
LINCOLN JOURNAL-STAR, Apr. 26, 2005, at 1. 
 159. Robak, supra note 123, at 818. 
 160. See NEBRASKA LEGISLATURE, ABOUT THE LEGISLATURE, http:// 
nebraskalegislature.gov/about/about.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2010). 
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three most important of these objections are: (1) that bicameral systems 
raise the costs of legislative action, ensuring that hasty decisions are not 
made; (2) that the bicameral legislative process better ensures factional 
legislation is not passed; and (3) in the absence of a bicameral system, ill-
conceived policy will prevail absent some other check, like an active 
judiciary. 
A. Bicameral Legislatures Ensure that Legislation Is More Carefully 
Considered Prior to Enactment 
The first critique of the unicameral focuses on the value of the 
bicameral in ensuring that legislation is properly considered prior to its 
enactment. “There will almost surely be less government intervention, 
less hasty legislation, and more preservation of the status quo if 
proposals must pass two hurdles rather than one,” writes Professor Saul 
Levmore.161 
Levmore also argues that the conference committee actually 
functions to produce better legislation because it leads to more efficient 
logrolling.162 While in a unicameral system, final bargaining on the 
legislation must include all members of the body, the conference 
committee system allows for an entire legislative body to resolve most of 
the important issues associated with a piece of legislation and then 
bargain over the final outstanding differences between chambers by 
delegating bargaining power to a small group of members.163 Levmore 
writes of conference committees, “interest groups may in the long run 
trade votes most efficiently in a single arena with relatively few 
players.”164 
B. Bicameral Legislatures Better Ensure that Factional Legislation Is 
Not Enacted 
Levmore notes that the bicameral ensures legislation is not enacted 
to serve only select, minority interests.165 According to this theory, in a 
unicameral system, one-quarter of all voters can control the outcome of 
legislation (one-half of all voters in one-half of all legislative districts); a 
 
 161. Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 
1992 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 151. 
 162. Id. at 150. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 151–52 (citing J. Buchanan, Social Choice, Democracy, and Free 
Markets, 62 J. POL. ECON. 114, 121–23 (1954)). 
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second chamber ensures that more than one-quarter of all voters are 
needed to dictate electoral results.166 
Professor James Rogers echoes this reason for having two houses. 
He argues, based on a theoretical model, that unicameral legislatures 
will always produce more factional legislation167 than bicameral 
legislatures.168 He then states that the increased cost of legislating in 
bicameral systems leads to an “incentive system that induces legislators 
to propose more equitable policies relative to unicameralism.”169 
There are two problems with this explanation for bicameralism’s 
persistence. First, Levmore points out that the presence of the executive 
veto also functions to ensure that legislation is enacted for the benefit of 
all, since the executive is elected to be the representative of the entire 
population.170 Second, Rogers’s assumption that there are indifferent 
legislators who will vote in favor of a bill does not appear to be rooted in 
reality. In the routine rigors of politics, it is highly unlikely that any 
legislator will have nothing at stake in a vote—seldom if ever will a 
legislator be truly indifferent to a bill and vote blindly in support of it. 
C. Unicameralism Can Only Succeed With Some External Check in the 
Legislative Process, Namely Heightened Judicial Scrutiny of 
Legislative Acts 
Assuming, arguendo, that unicameral legislatures do produce 
legislation that is either imprudent or factional, scholars have reasoned 
that some extra-legislative safeguard must exist in the lawmaking 
process to ensure that the state is not plagued by bad laws. 
 
 166. Levmore, supra note 161, at 152. 
    167.  Rogers, supra note 109, at 94–95. Factional legislation is considered legis-
lation that benefits select citizens rather than the greater population. Id. 
 168. Id. Rogers’ model imagines a unicameral legislature consisting of three 
factions. He argues that a proposal introduced in a legislature in which one 
faction will receive all of the benefit of the proposal, and another district will 
bear the entire cost, will always pass because the third faction, receiving neither 
benefit nor cost, will vote with the benefitted faction, and the legislation would 
be supported by a 2:1 ratio. Id. However, in a bicameral system, if the same 
measure passed by one house is introduced in the second house by a legislator 
bearing the burden of the legislation, then the indifferent legislators will vote 
with the burdened legislators, thereby defeating the factional bill. Id. 
 169. Id. at 96. 
 170. Levmore, supra note 161, at 155. See also Robak, supra note 123, at 815–16 
(“It is the Governor’s duty to ensure the popular view is taken and parochial 
interests do not control. As a statewide officeholder, the Governor is the true 
check and balance.”). 
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Levmore notes that the most immediate external check, which all 
legislation is already subjected to in every state, is the executive veto.171 
This check relies upon only one actor, however, who is often subject to 
corruption, political whims, factionalism, or simply an unwise policy 
view. If the premise that unicameral legislatures produce weaker 
legislation is accurate, then this is an unsatisfactory remedy to this 
problem. 
Rogers points to a second check which he argues is necessary for 
unicameralism to be successful, one which he argues Norris and his 
Progressive cohorts anticipated would exist—heightened judicial 
scrutiny of legislative actions.172 He points out that the rise of the early 
twentieth century Progressives advocating unicameralism coincided 
with the Supreme Court’s endorsement of substantive due process.173 
Rogers writes, “It is precisely because courts were exercising a 
heightened review prerogative that Barnett (a Progressive writer of the 
era) concluded that the checks and balances provided by the second 
chamber were no longer necessary.”174 He argues that unicameral 
advocates expected that courts reviewing the actions of the new one-
house chambers would frequently impose a rigorous means-ends 
analysis, demanding an empirical basis for the enactment of a particular 
piece of legislation.175 
However, Lochner was repudiated by the Supreme Court in 1937 
and replaced by a rational basis standard of review for most legislative 
 
 171. Levmore, supra note 161, at 155. 
 172. Rogers, supra note 109, at 79–81. 
 173. Id. at 81–83. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a 
New York statute regulating the working hours of bakers was void because it 
interfered with the “freedom to contract,” implicit in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 174. Rogers, supra note 109, at 81 n.80 (quoting John P. Senning, THE ONE-
HOUSE LEGISLATURE, 75–77 (1937) (“As judicial review became a rationalization of 
the sovereign will as expressed in the states’ fundamental law, the people placed 
chief reliance upon the courts for protection against infringement of their rights 
by the legislature.”)). 
 175. Rogers, supra note 109, at 84. Rogers writes,  
Unicameral proponents lived in the Lochner world in which an activist 
judiciary reviewed the empirical basis for the ends and means of legis-
lation. While the proponents objected to the specific results which they 
believed wrongly struck down Progressive legislation, the existence of 
an active judiciary played a critical role in the systems of checks and 
balances they outlined in unicameral constitutional systems 
 Id. 
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actions.176 Rogers argues that in order to achieve the vision of the 
unicameral advocates—a single-house legislature with adequate 
external checks—state courts must be more active and demanding in 
their review of the legislature’s work.177 
While there is some logic to the notion that when one check in the 
legislative process is removed, a new check should be introduced to 
account for that loss, the above argument is not entirely convincing. 
Arguing that the judiciary should be quick to stand in and play an 
increased role in the policymaking process when a chamber is 
eliminated makes an erroneous assumption about the role of the courts. 
Judicial review is exercised based on constitutional provisions and 
should operate similarly regardless of the structure of the legislature. 
Without altering any of these provisions, such as a guarantee of due 
process, equal protection, or free speech, a court probably would have 
no basis for upsetting established precedent regarding the level of 
scrutiny it gives to legislative enactments. 
VI. A UNICAMERAL FOR ALASKA? 
As mentioned above, Alaskans did not completely dismiss the 
notion of the unicameral system after the defeat of the proposal in 1955. 
In recent years, several prominent Alaskans, as well as average citizens, 
have called for the creation of a unicameral system. 
In 2002, former Alaska attorney general John Havelock wrote that a 
unicameral was an obvious choice in Alaska because it would abolish 
 
 176. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that the 
State was free to establish a minimum wage law, despite its infringement on the 
previously identified freedom to contract). 
 177. Rogers, supra note 109, at 103 (suggesting that state courts review all 
legislative acts to determine if they have a “‘substantial relation’ to an actual, 
legitimate governmental purpose, or a legitimate governmental purpose that 
could have been reasonably presumed to have motivated an impartial 
legislature”).  This proposed scrutiny level closely resembles the Supreme 
Court’s intermediate level scrutiny of its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, 
which is applied to state actions that classify based on gender. See United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that a state’s policy of denying females 
admission to a military college was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause because the state failed to demonstrate that the state’s 
important governmental objectives in denying admission to women were 
substantially related to the discriminatory policy). The only distinction between 
Rogers’s proposed standard and the Court’s intermediate level of review is that 
the Court looks only to what actually motivated the legislature, id. at 532–33, 
while Rogers allows for reviewing courts to look to either: (1) what actually 
motivated the legislature; or (2) what could be presumed to have motivated the 
legislature, Rogers, supra note 109, at 103.  As a result, Rogers’s proposal would 
create a default level slightly less rigorous than intermediate scrutiny. 
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the anachronistic senate, which was beholden to special interests.178 Of 
the smaller districts that would result from a one-house system, 
Havelock wrote that it would lead to “substituting shoe leather for 
greenbacks as campaign energy. Smaller places would enjoy undivided 
representation.”179 
Former Alaska governor and United States Interior Secretary Wally 
Hickel was a fierce advocate for Alaska’s adoption of the unicameral. In 
2007, he wrote a column stating that the current legislature was “in 
shambles” due to its being beholden to lobbyists and an entrenched 
political machine.180 He suggested that Alaska adopt a unicameral 
system as a means of opening up the legislative process and restoring 
trust in Alaska’s government.181 In 2009, Hickel wrote that a unicameral 
legislature would better allow for the formation of coalitions between 
urban and rural representatives and Democrats and Republicans.182 He 
stated that modern issues demanded the type of teamwork that a 
unicameral would engender.183 Of the Nebraska model, Hickel stated, 
“[It] has worked well and would fit independent-minded Alaskans 
whose shared values and aspirations rarely show up in national party 
platforms.”184 
The following imagines what an effective unicameral legislature 
might look like in Alaska—a chamber of sixty members elected to four 
year terms with increased procedure designed to ensure the body’s 
deliberativeness. It then considers the reasons why Alaskans should 
adopt such a system and why they should be hesitant to adopt a 
unicameral. 
A. The Look of an Alaskan Unicameral 
Since 1993, four bills have been introduced in the House of 
Representatives that would have amended the Alaska Constitution to 
create a unicameral legislature.185 None has survived its House 
 
 178. John Havelock, Anachronistic Senate Should Go, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
July 1, 2002, at B4. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Wally Hickel, It’s Time to Overhaul Our Legislature, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 30, 2007, at H2. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Wally Hickel, Bold Action Is Needed In Trying Times, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 1, 2009, at B4. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See H.R.J. Res. 36, 25th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2008); H.R.J. Res. 11, 20th 
Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997); H.R.J. Res. 2, 19th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1995); 
H.R.J. Res. 2, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1993). 
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committee assignment.186 Nonetheless, the failed legislation provides the 
beginning of a model for an Alaska unicameral. From this model, one 
can assess the merits and problems associated with implementing such a 
system in Alaska. 
The most recent unicameral proposal, H.R.J. 36 of 2008, proposed 
that the unicameral legislature consist of sixty senators elected to four-
year terms (with half of the body subject to election every two years)187 
from districts drawn by the Redistricting Board.188 This model would 
maintain the total current number of legislative seats.189 While some, 
including Havelock, have suggested that seats might be added to the 
legislature should it become just one house,190 doing so may make the 
body potentially too large for manageable debate. Furthermore, it might 
add significant expense in the form of additional legislative staff, 
salaries, and travel expenses. Therefore, this Note analyzes the 
possibility of a sixty-member unicameral legislature for Alaska. 
This most recent proposal kept the actual legislative process within 
the new unicameral substantively identical to the process that currently 
exists within each single chamber.191 However, in order to assuage the 
fears of those who think a unicameral legislature will act too quickly, a 
future proposal should include the two legislative pace-slowing 
mechanisms found in Nebraska’s Constitution: requiring four floor 
readings of a bill before passage and public hearings for all bills before 
they are reported out of committee.192 
B. Why Alaska Should Adopt a Unicameral 
1.  One of the Constitutional Convention’s primary reasons for adopt-
ing the present bicameral system is now obsolete 
As described above, Alaska’s Constitutional Convention delegates 
were very concerned with ensuring that Alaskans living in rural areas 
had an equal voice in the government.193 To do this, they adopted a 
bicameral system with seats in the upper house apportioned based on 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. This term length has worked satisfactorily in the Alaska Senate, and it 
would presumably work effectively in a unicameral legislature. 
 188. Alaska H.R.J. Res. 36. 
 189. Currently, Alaska’s Senate has twenty members, and the House of 
Representatives has forty members. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 190. Havelock, supra note 178. 
 191. Alaska H.R.J. Res. 36. 
 192. See Robak, supra note 123, at 802. 
 193. See NASKE, supra note 31, at 264–71.  
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geography.194 However, in the wake of Reynolds,195 Alaska was left with 
two houses that were both apportioned based on population.196 This 
decision resulted in no safeguard in the apportionment stage for 
protecting the interests of rural voters. 
There are other means of allotting legislative authority based on 
geography that Alaska could adopt that would not violate the rule from 
Reynolds. For example, Alaska could require that each region of the State 
be represented on the legislature’s most influential committee by at least 
one senator, as Nebraska does.197 However, such a proposal could be 
implemented in either a bicameral or unicameral system—a unicameral 
legislative system does not provide unique ways for states to circumvent 
Reynolds and engage in geographic representation. Therefore, the 
Court’s rule from Reynolds does not add a new reason to adopt a 
unicameral legislature. Rather, it negates one of the primary reasons that 
delegates cited for adopting a bicameral system, thereby bolstering the 
case for the unicameral. 
2. Under a unicameral legislature, legislators would have smaller dis-
tricts enabling them to be more responsive to constituent needs 
Alaska currently has sixty legislative districts—twenty Senate 
Districts and forty House Districts198—spread across 663,268 square 
miles,199 making the average Senate District 33,163 square miles and the 
average House District 16,581 square miles.  In comparison, the average 
Senate District in the next largest state, Texas, is only 8,671 square 
miles200—almost half the size of the average district in Alaska’s larger 
chamber. 201 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 196. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 1–3, amended by 
H.R.J. Res. 44, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1998). The State had been operating 
under population-based apportionment since 1972, when the state supreme 
court ruled that both houses of the legislature must be apportioned based on 
population. Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856 (Alaska 1972). 
 197. Robak, supra note 123. 
 198. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 199. OXFORD ATLAS OF NORTH AMERICA, 121 (H. J. de Blij ed. 2005). 
 200. The Texas Senate consists of 31 members, TEXAS CONST. art. III, § 2, 
representing a total of 268,820 square miles, OXFORD ATLAS OF NORTH AMERICA, 
supra note 199, at 161. 
 201. Examples of large districts include: (1) Senate District R, stretching 
almost the entire width of the State, from the border with Canada to about 150 
miles inland from the Bering Sea—some 700 miles, and also reaching 530 miles 
from north to south; (2) House District 40, reaching almost the entire length of 
the Alaska Peninsula and the Aleutian Islands—with 1,000 miles approximately 
separating the district’s westernmost and easternmost points; (3) Senate District 
S, stretching almost 900 miles across the northern and western parts of the State, 
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These exceedingly large districts, along with Alaska’s varying 
terrain, harsh climate, low population density, and diverse local 
interests, pose particular challenges for legislators representing these 
large rural districts. In interviews with legislators, it appeared that the 
most daunting of these challenges lies in traveling across the districts, 
which is necessary to engage constituents. Senate Minority Leader Con 
Bunde reported that representatives from these large districts often are 
unable to reach many of the communities within their districts in 
conventional vehicles—they must rely upon small airplanes, boats, 
ferries, or even all-terrain vehicles.202 Such travel can be time consuming 
and costly. With each member allotted the same expense budget 
intended to cover travel regardless of district size,203 members 
representing larger districts have much greater difficulty providing 
quality representation through constituent contact than those 
representing more compact, urban areas. As a result, many Alaskans in 
rural districts are forced to accept less person-to-person contact with 
their legislators. Representative Paul Seaton stated that the two villages 
and one town in his district that are inaccessible by roads are “mostly 
contacted via phone, email, or when their contact folks (municipal 
leaders) visit Homer (the largest town in his district).”204 While 
legislators describe making extra efforts to provide non-in-person 
communication with rural voters,205 it is inarguable that a vital part of 
the democratic process—personal communication with voters—is 
sacrificed to some extent in these large districts. 
In addition to causing travel difficulties, large districts with diverse 
interest groups pose problems for legislators trying to represent the 
 
and covering more square miles than the entire State of Texas. See ALASKA 
REDISTRICTING BOARD, AMENDED FINAL REDISTRICTING PLAN 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.juneauempire.com/legislature/stories/statewide.pdf. 
 202. E-mail from Sen. Con Bunde, Minority Leader, Alaska Senate, to author 
(Dec. 10, 2009, 21:33:00 EST) (on file with author). 
 203. ALASKA STAT. § 24.10.110 (2009). Legislators can also seek state funding 
for travel expenses within their districts provided that it is for state business. 
Telephone Interview with Sen. Johnny Ellis, Alaska Senate (Dec. 10, 2009). 
However, Rep. Bill Thomas described this funding as subject to some variability 
depending upon the political climate. Telephone Interview with Rep. Bill 
Thomas, Alaska House of Representatives (Dec. 17, 2009). 
 204. E-mail from Rep. Paul Seaton, Alaska House of Representatives, to 
author (Dec. 19, 2009, 17:03:00 AKST) (on file with author). 
 205. Rep. Seaton reported that he sends out a weekly e-mail newsletter to 
interested constituents (approximately 600) and prints copies of the newsletter to 
send to the district’s libraries and senior citizens’ centers. Id. Rep. Thomas said 
that he relies primarily on the telephone and email to communicate with his 
most rural constituents. Rep. Thomas, supra note 203. 
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needs of their constituents. This challenge is seen in two aspects of the 
representative process. 
First, legislators in large districts are more likely to have constituent 
groups with vastly different opinions on key issues because their 
communities are separated by considerable distances. Describing this 
diversity of interests as the greatest challenge in representing his large 
district, Representative Seaton writes: 
For example, my largest community, Homer, likes economic 
development in small business and small project size and is 
extremely environmentally sensitive—[it is] the only nuclear 
free zone in Alaska, [it] already has a climate change task force 
and [it has] officially adopted a sustainability plan.  My second 
largest community, Seward, likes large projects and any 
economic development, including the only maximum security 
prison in the State and an export coal port, and was hoping for 
a huge storage terminal for gas and diesel coming to Alaska by 
tanker.206 
Second, in a large district with hundreds of communities, it 
becomes very difficult for a legislator to secure an appropriation that 
will serve a large swath of her district. Senate Majority Leader Johnny 
Ellis stated that he can hypothetically secure an appropriation for a 
public park that will provide benefit for his entire Anchorage district. 
Ellis then noted that if a rural legislator were to bargain for an 
appropriation for a new sewer system for one of his villages, he would 
have hundreds of other villages upset that he did not provide new 
sewer systems for them as well.207 Because rural legislators cannot 
possibly secure unique appropriations for each of the villages within 
their districts during each budgeting process,208 they are forced to place 
the needs of one set of constituents ahead of another. Urban legislators, 
on the other hand, are able to provide for all constituents with each 
appropriation. 
While the problem of very large districts in Alaska will persist so 
long as Reynolds remains, a unicameral system would lead to somewhat 
more manageable, smaller districts. Under the current bicameral system, 
rural Alaskans have two representatives in the legislature. However, 
these legislators, a senator and a representative, both have large districts 
 
 206. Rep. Seaton, supra note 204. 
 207. Sen. Ellis, supra note 203. 
 208. Rep. Seaton stated that he requires each community to prioritize its 
needs in advance of the budget process and that he attempts to spread 
appropriations across his district as best as he can, based on this local 
prioritization. Rep. Seaton, supra note 204. 
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that cover the same area, with the senator’s district being slightly larger. 
Under a unicameral system, a voter would have only one representative, 
but his representative would represent a unique part of Alaska and 
serve a smaller district. With sixty legislative districts spread across the 
State, the average district would be only 11,054 square miles. In addition 
to having smaller districts geographically, each legislator would have 
fewer constituents to represent. Whereas currently each senator 
represents an average of 31,347 Alaskans and each House member 
represents an average of 15,673 Alaskans,209 each district would have an 
average population of just 11,491 in a sixty-member unicameral. 
With geographically smaller and less populous districts, legislators: 
(1) could devote more time to traveling to communities difficult to 
reach; (2) could give individual constituent needs greater attention; (3) 
might serve more homogenous interests within these communities; and 
(4) might be able to better attain appropriations that would serve larger 
portions of their districts.210 
3.  A unicameral legislature would be more publicly accountable and 
might reduce corruption within the legislature 
Proponents of the unicameral argue that a unicameral system 
would reduce legislative corruption in two ways.211 First, it would 
require that important legislative actions take place on the chamber’s 
floor, rather than in conference committee.212 Second, it would make it 
more difficult for a special interest group to influence the outcome of 
legislation.213 Whereas currently an interest would only need to 
influence eleven senators to kill a bill (or just two conferees), under a 
sixty-member unicameral system a group would need to change the 
votes of thirty-one legislators. In advocating for a unicameral system, 
Anchorage Daily News editor Michael Carey wrote, “A unicameral 
legislature also would be more accountable. Without a senate, 
lawmakers could no longer point their fingers down the hall to blame 
the other guy for increasing the budget, delaying the session, killing 
 
 209. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CONSTITUENTS PER STATE 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT 1 (2009),  http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/ 
Redistricting/ConstituentsperStateLegislativeDistrict/tabid/16643/Default.asp. 
 210. The problem of large districts could also be addressed by simply adding 
members to the existing House and Senate. However, doing so would also mean 
added expense. The unicameral proposal allows for Alaskans to receive more 
personal representation in a smaller district, while simultaneously reducing the 
total number of legislators, leading to financial savings for the State. 
 211. See supra Part III.B. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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important legislation. Lawmakers would lose a major excuse for their 
failures.”214 Carey further argued that abolishing the Senate would also 
rid the state of the backroom deal making nature of the upper chamber. 
He wrote of the Senate, “The body’s important business is done through 
private arrangements. Senators can sit on a bill for months then 
suddenly there’s a deal and it’s off to the floor where it passes with 
minimal discussion.”215 
In recent years, Alaska has been the subject of a federal 
investigation into corruption that has led to the convictions of four 
former state legislators.216 The adoption of a unicameral legislature 
might be a useful tool in restoring public confidence in the integrity of 
government.  A unicameral legislature would raise the cost of future 
bribery attempts and ensure that legislative activity is done in an open 
setting. 
4.  Alaska’s judiciary will strike down unconstitutional legislation 
The Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Alaska 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause217 has led to much more rigorous 
review of statutes than has the United States Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the substantially similar Federal Equal Protection 
Clause.218 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a three-tiered 
approach for reviewing laws that classify individuals. It reserves its 
most rigorous scrutiny for statutes which make “suspect 
classifications”219 or those which infringe upon “fundamental rights,”220 
 
 214. Michael Carey, Alaska Needs a Unicameral Legislature, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, May 11, 1993, at E6. 
 215. Id. While there is nothing structural about a unicameral that would make 
it any less prone to deal making outside of the legislative chamber, abolishing 
the culture of the Senate could be an important step towards creating a more 
transparent government for the State. 
 216. See generally FBI Investigations into Alaska Politics, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, http://www.adn.com/news/politics/fbi/. The federal investigation 
related to the official actions of several Alaska state legislators in matters 
pertaining to the oil industry, private fishing industry, and private corrections 
industry. Investigators believed that legislators had corrupt ties with executives 
of an oilfield services company. The probe led to the indictments of five current 
and former Alaska legislators. 
 217. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (“[A]ll persons are equal and entitled to equal 
rights, opportunities, and protection under the law . . . .”). 
 218. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 219. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that race is a suspect 
classification warranting strict scrutiny). 
 220. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to 
marriage is fundamental, warranting strict scrutiny). 
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and subjects most other statutes to rational basis review.221 However, the 
Alaska Supreme Court has developed a sliding scale approach that 
determines the level of scrutiny that it will apply to a statute. The Court 
considers the importance of the individual rights asserted by the 
statute’s challenger and reviews the suspicious nature of the 
classification scheme.222 Based on this formula, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has struck down statutes after finding that they unnecessarily 
denied an important right to an individual.  This is true even when the 
statute did not make a suspect classification or infringe upon a 
fundamental right under federal jurisprudence.223 
The court has also tended to strike down statutes under the Due 
Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution.224 The state judiciary has 
followed the Supreme Court and stated that the default level of review 
for a statute said to interfere with due process is the deferential rational 
basis review, reserving strict scrutiny for statutes that interfere with a 
fundamental right.225 The court, however, has been willing to find 
 
 221. E.g., Ry Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
 222. E.g., State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192–93 (Alaska 1983) (“In contrast 
to the rigid tiers of federal equal protection analysis, we have postulated a single 
sliding scale of review ranging from relaxed scrutiny to strict scrutiny. The 
applicable standard of review for a given case is to be determined by the 
importance of the individual rights asserted and by the degree of suspicion with 
which we view the resulting classification scheme.”). 
 223. E.g., Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 471–72 (Alaska 1988) 
(holding that a six-year statute of repose for bringing tort actions against 
architectural design professionals violated the equal protection clause because it 
interfered with the right to be protected from negligent construction and the 
State had failed to show why imposing a six-year limitation would accomplish 
the goal of encouraging construction); City of Valdez v. 18.99 Acres, 686 P.2d 
682, 691–92 (Alaska 1984) (holding that a statute fixing  pre- and post-judgment 
interest rates in “quick-take” condemnation proceedings at a low six percent was 
unconstitutional because there was no empirical basis for charging the State the 
lower rate when it used that proceeding; Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 
687 P.2d 264, 273–74 (Alaska 1984) (holding that a Worker’s Compensation 
Insurance statute, which allowed an insurer to adjust benefit payments when the 
payee relocates to a state with a presumed lower cost of living was an 
unconstitutional violation of equal protection because it infringed upon: (1) the 
right for qualifying individuals to receive insurance benefits, and (2) the right to 
travel. The court held that the State’s asserted interest in encouraging people to 
return to work and remain in the state and to continue receiving insurance 
benefits did not justify the measure because the State had not shown that the 
reduction in benefits allowed actually reflected lower costs of living in other 
states);. For a discussion of these cases, see Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal 
Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209 (1998). 
 224. ALASKA CONST. art I. § 7. 
 225. See Concerned Citizens v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 
(Alaska 1974) (holding that the legislature’s creation of a hospital service zone 
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additional fundamental rights that are not explicit in the Alaska 
Constitution. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks,226 the court extended the 
constitutional right to a jury trial: 
We are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional 
rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find 
such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the 
intention and spirit of our local constitutional language and to 
be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty 
which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.227 
Citing Baker, the court has found unconstitutional: (1) a statute that 
required individuals who had had sex offenses set aside to still enter 
their names in a registry;228 (2) the policy of a state-funded hospital to 
refuse to perform elective abortions;229 and (3) a statute automatically 
revoking the driver’s license of those found guilty of underage 
consumption of alcohol.230 
While some have argued that the Alaska judiciary has 
unnecessarily and unpredictably thrust itself into the policymaking 
role,231 such judicial activity would be beneficial should Alaska change 
to a unicameral system. As noted above, there is no merit to the 
argument that a judiciary should alter its jurisprudence based on a 
change in the structure of a coordinate branch. However, should a 
unicameral legislature begin to produce statutes that infringe upon the 
rights of any Alaska citizens or prove to be harmful to the State’s overall 
health, it seems quite likely that Alaska’s courts would strike down such 
statutes within existing review frameworks. 
 
was not an arbitrary act and survived rational basis scrutiny, despite the 
objections of local taxpayers). 
 226. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
 227. Id. at 402. 
 228. Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004). 
 229. Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coal. for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 
1997) (“[R]eproductive rights are fundamental . . . .”). 
 230. State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2000) (holding that the State 
had not met its burden of showing that there was an empirical link between the 
evil sought to be prohibited and the sanction imposed, and therefore criminal 
process was required before the State could impose such a punishment). 
 231. See McGreal, supra note 223, at 274 (“The court appears to use a pure 
means-end analysis that is unguided by any constitutional principle related to 
equality . . . . [T]he court has not developed a principled approach to means-end 
analysis, and instead registered its agreement or disagreement with particular 
statutes.”). 
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C. Reasons Alaska Should Be Hesitant to Adopt a Unicameral System 
1. Due to Alaska’s population distribution, large legislative districts 
would not be altogether eliminated 
While a unicameral system would reduce the size of legislative 
districts on the whole, legislators representing urban areas would still 
have much smaller districts because the federal constitution mandates 
proportionality. Legislators representing rural districts would, on the 
whole, still have much more territory to represent. If Alaska’s rural 
voters are to live in a smaller district with a representative more 
accountable to their needs, new district lines will have to be drawn so 
large rural territories are not attached to urban districts. Such an 
arrangement would increase the power of urban voters at the expense of 
rural Alaskans. Instead, the state would need to draw urban districts in 
as compressed a manner as possible and then equitably distribute the 
rural districts in a way that attempts to minimize the size and diversity 
of interests of each one. 
The Alaska Constitution envisions a system that does not include 
the type of gerrymandering by the state legislature that occurs in other 
state’s redistricting battles. Instead, it allows for reapportionment by a 
non-partisan, five-member Redistricting Board, consisting of two 
members appointed by the governor, one by the presiding officer of the 
Senate, one by the presiding officer of the House, and one by the State’s 
Chief Justice.232 While such a system might be more likely to craft a plan 
that would maximize smaller districts for rural voters than would a 
system where the legislature is entrusted with drawing its own lines, the 
significant risk of the board being dominated by urban Alaskans creates 
a good chance that the lines would not be drawn in a way to reduce the 
size of the rural districts. 
2.  The conference committee structure is not currently subject to great 
abuse 
Currently, the legislature’s Uniform Rules provide for a three-part 
process of convening conference committees in the event that the two 
chambers pass different versions of a bill and one chamber refuses to 
recede from its version.233 First, a conference committee must be 
convened with three members from each chamber (appointed by the 
chamber’s presiding officer), gathering only to agree to include 
 
 232. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
 233. UNIF. R. ALASKA STATE LEGIS. 42. 
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previously adopted amendments in one of the chamber’s bills.234 If the 
committee is unable to reach agreement, or if a chamber rejects the bill 
reported out of conference, then the committee is given “limited powers 
of free conference” to introduce new amendments only on specific 
points of contention.235 If the committee still cannot produce a 
satisfactory bill, a new, free conference committee, convened in the same 
manner, is authorized to “suggest in its report any new amendments 
clearly germane to the question” in order to produce an acceptable piece 
of legislation.236 
This exhaustive procedure ensures that legislators appointed to 
conference committees will not be able to hijack legislation by including 
provisions in bills that were not adequately considered in open debate. 
It ensures that Alaska’s conference committees do not become de facto 
unicameral legislatures, as Norris warned against. 
Further, not many bills other than the annual budget make it to 
conference committees.237 During the last five completed legislative 
sessions from 1999 to 2008, just fifty-six, or four percent of 1,256 passed 
bills went to conference committee, with over half of those being 
appropriations bills.238 The overwhelming majority of substantive 
legislation passed in Alaska is done through the open process of floor 
debate, without convening a conference committee. 
In the infrequent cases where conference committees are convened, 
they are open to the public. The conference process was described by 
interviewed legislators as being fairly responsive to the needs of the 
general legislative bodies. Senate Minority Leader Bunde stated, “In 
general, I believe that on a state level, the conference committee process 
represents the majority of legislators, much better than perhaps at the 
federal level.”239 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Given the intricacies involved in the crafting of a state’s budget, it seems 
logical that the final negotiations would take place not on a legislative floor, but 
rather in a small committee setting, which is better suited for collaborative 
negotiation. Even if a unicameral system were adopted, some sort of small 
committee likely would still have to be convened to resolve disputes in the 
budgeting process. Therefore, the analysis of the use of conference committees is 
limited to their use in non-budgetary matters. 
 238. See THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, BILLS & LAWS 1 (2010), http:// 
www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/start.asp. The legislature’s website provides a tab 
for each session since 1993, each of which includes lists of all bills sent to 
conference committees during those sessions. 
 239. Sen. Bunde, supra note 202. 
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Two legislators did state that on occasion, the actions of conference 
committees are preordained by legislative leadership, making the 
conference committee’s deliberations perfunctory. Representative 
Seaton stated that he had served on two conference committees, one of 
which included a fully public negotiation, while the other consisted 
entirely of reaching predetermined agreements.240 He said that he felt 
that the type of conference committee generally depends upon 
legislative philosophies of the chambers’ presiding officers.241 Senate 
Majority Leader Ellis reported that there are occasional complaints 
about orchestration that occurs prior to conference committees by 
legislative leadership, but when the matter is of great public policy 
importance, all legislators go to great efforts to keep the process as 
transparent and open as possible.242 
Though the conference committee can potentially turn the open 
legislative process into an exercise in behind-closed-doors horse-trading, 
this appears to occur highly infrequently in Alaska, if at all. Therefore, 
concern over the power of conference committees cannot justify 
revamping Alaska’s legislative system. 
3.  The gubernatorial veto would probably not be an adequate check on 
anunwise legislature 
The governor is the most immediate check upon the legislature 
because the Alaska Constitution gives him the power to veto bills 
produced by the legislature, either entirely or in part.243 The veto power, 
however, has been used infrequently. During the last five legislative 
sessions, a period which has coincided with the terms of three different 
governors, one Democrat and two Republicans, only twenty bills have 
been partially vetoed and eighteen bills have been entirely vetoed.244 
Only three percent of all bills passed by the legislature during this 
period failed to receive the governor’s approval—an even lower number 
than the percentage of bills referred to conference.245 These numbers 
indicate that Alaska’s governors traditionally defer to the wisdom of the 
legislature when considering passed bills. Given such a tradition of 
deference, it is unlikely that the executive could be relied upon to 
impose a significant check in the lawmaking process. 
 
 240. Rep. Seaton, supra note 204. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Sen. Ellis, supra note 203. 
 243. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 15. 
 244. THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, supra note 238. 
 245. Id. 
ROSS_CPCXNS.DOC 12/9/2010  3:40:57 PM 
296 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [27:2 
4.   Alaskans are familiar with the two-house structure that has been in 
place since the constitution’s drafting 
Abolishing an entire house of a state’s legislature is a radical move 
that could provoke a fierce public outcry. Despite the reasons in favor of 
adopting the unicameral, they will be moot should the citizens of Alaska 
decide that there is no need to alter the existing system. There are 
several potential reasons that individuals might be hesitant to make 
such a change, including: (1) close and effective relationships between 
representatives and senators representing the same constituents; (2) 
satisfaction of constituents having two voices and two representatives to 
provide them with government-related services, rather than just one; 
and (3) deference to the work of the drafters of the constitution and to 
their wisdom in setting up what has for the most part proven to be an 
effective governing framework. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are more reasons described for Alaska to switch to a 
unicameral system than there are reasons for retaining the existing 
bicameral legislature. However, this Note merely seeks to generate 
thought about the most practical and effective way for Alaskans to 
govern themselves as they face the second half-century of statehood. 
During Alaska’s five decades of statehood, it has proven to be a 
free-thinking state that places little value on blindly emulating the other 
forty-nine states. Some will argue that a system in use in forty-nine of 
the fifty states surely must be the most effective. Yet Alaska—in the 
decisions of its courts, the actions of its legislature, the very progressive 
clauses in its constitution, and the general attitude of its people—has 
demonstrated a great capability to be a model for the rest of the country. 
It has lived into Justice Brandeis’s famous exhortation that each state 
should “serve as a laboratory [of democracy].”246 What greater 
experiment in state government could Alaska take on than this one? 
Should Alaskans decide to engage in this experiment, they would have 
Nebraska as their model and would, at the same time, be a model for 
other states—demonstrating that even amidst the political gridlock and 
economic turmoil of the early twenty-first century, innovation for more 
effective government can still be implemented. 
 
 
 
 246. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1962) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
